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GUARDIANSHIP: TIME FOR A REASSESSMENT
ROGER B. SHERMAN*
INTRODUCTION
A revolution is afoot in the area of mental health. Courts have rec-
ognized that the mentally ill and the mentally retarded in state
institutions have a right to treatment.' Substantial due process pro-
tections have reinforced previously loose and informal commitment
procedures, 2 and under the concept of the "least restrictive alterna-
tive," institutionalization can only be used as a last resort.3
Moreover, these victories are not likely to be shortlived for many of
these rights have been codified in several jurisdictions.4
* B.A. 1973, Colby College; J.D. 1977, Syracuse University College of Law. Mr.
Sherman was a Law Clerk to Thomas E. Delahanty and David A. Nichols, Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine, 1977-1979, Assistant Attorney General of Maine, 1979-1980;
he is now associated with the firm of Hochberg & Schultz, Boston, Massachusetts.
1. See Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 455 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (in civil commit-
ments the need for a right to treatment may exceed the need for procedural protec-
tions); Evans v. Washington, 459 F. Supp. 483, 484 (D.D.C. 1978) (the mentally
retarded, committed to institutional care, have a "constitutional right to habilitative
care and treatment"); Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp.
1295, 1315-16 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (commitment of the mentally retarded is constitution-
ally justified only if habilitation is provided), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and re-
manded en banc, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 2984 (1980);
Gary W. v. Louisiana, 437 F. Supp. 1209, 1216 (E.D. La. 1976) (the state must
return some benefit for the deprivation of liberty involved in commitment), aff'd,
601 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1979); Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 491-500 (D. Minn.
1974) (commitment of the mentally retarded gives rise to a right to treatment under
due process), aff'd in part, vacated in part, and remanded, 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir.
1977); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 390-91 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (civil com-
mitment of the mentally ill gives rise to a constitutional right to habilitation), aff'd in
part, remanded in part and decision reserved in part sub nora. Wyatt v. Aderholt,
503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). See also notes 160-67 infra and accompanying text.
2. See A.B.A., State Laws Governing Civil Commitment, 3 Mental Disability L.
Rep. 206, 206-14 (1979) (tabulation of relevant statutes). See also notes 70, 81 infra
and accompanying text.
3. See Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (the court should
inquire into less restrictive courses of treatment). See also notes 123-27 infra and
accompanying text.
4. Statutes provide a right to a hearing with counsel following involuntary coin-
mitment for mental illness. See, e.g., D.C. Code. Encycl. §§ 21-525, 21-527 to -545
(West 1967); Md. Ann. Code art. 59, § 13 (1979); Va. Code. § 37.1-67.1 (1980).
Similarly, a statutory right to treatment for the mentally ill and the mentally retarded
has been created. See, e.g., Md. Ann. Code art. 59, § 3A (1979); Va. Code § 54-
325.2:1 (1980).
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These sweeping changes have largely bypassed one aspect of men-
tal health law, the area of guardianship. Guardianship is a legal rela-
tionship in which one individual, the guardian, becomes a "substitute
decisionmaker" for another, the ward. 5 The relationship commences
following a hearing in which the would-be ward is declared "incompe-
tent" to manage his personal affairs, his property, or more commonly,
both person and property. 6 The consequences of being declared in-
competent are serious. The ward may lose his right to vote, marry,
contract, convey property, and engage in a business or a profession. 7
In view of these deprivations, it vould seem that the appointment of a
guardian would necessitate a hearing with a panoply of due process
protections. In fact, the hearing is usually ex parte and lasts but a few
minutes. 8
Surprisingly, the procedural and substantive inadequacies of guard-
ianship have aroused little concern from either commentators or the
law reform movement. 9 This Article will outline the procedural
safeguards that should exist at a guardianship hearing.10 By use of
the least restrictive alternative theory, it will argue that the guardian
should be permitted to perform only those functions that the ward is
clearly incapable of performing. 1 Finally, constitutional considera-
tions should require the guardian to develop a treatment p-n for his
5. See Vargyas, Guardianship, in I Legal Rights of Mentally Disabled Persons,
P.L.I. Course Handbook Series No. 114, at 339, 341 (1979); 39 Am. Jur. 2d
Guardian and Ward § 1 (1968); 39 C.J.S. Guardian and Ward § 2 (1976). In the
context of this Article, the definition of guardianship will be restricted to the "legal
relationship" imposed upon alleged incompetent adults, rather than a guardianship
established to care for minors.
6. See A.B.A. Comm. on the Mentally Disabled, Guardianship & Convervator-
ship 3-4 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Guardianship & Conservatorship]. This source
contains extensive state by state tabulations of current guardianship statutes. Id. at
9-73.
7. See notes 43-47 infra and accompanying text.
8. See R. Allen, E. Ferster & H. Weihofen, Mental Impairment and Legal In-
competency 83 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Mental Impairment and Legal Incom-
petency].
9. Only one direct attack has been launched at guardianship to date. A class
action suit challenged the procedures for the appointment of a guardian, and asserted
the right to the minimum number of restrictions on personal and property rights if a
guardian was found necessary. Justice v. Superior Court. No. 79-1524 (D.D.C. June
27, 1979) (complaint dismissed), vacated and remanded, No. 79-1818 (D.C. Cir. June
24, 1980). The complaint is reprinted in 1 Legal Rights of Mentally Disabled Per-
sons, P.L.I. Course Handbook Series No. 114, at 379 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Legal Rights]. Although a number of treatises and model statutes address the de-
ficiencies of guardianship, only one article thoroughly discusses and advocates sub-
stantial procedural reforms. Horstman, Protective Services for the Elderly: The Limits
of Parens Patriae, 40 Mo. L. Rev. 215 (1975).
10. See pt. II infra.
11. See pt. III(A) infra.
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ward designed to overcome the deficiency that necessitated the ap-
pointment of a guardian, or at the least, to ameliorate his condition. 1 2
I. PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES OF GUARDIANSHIP
A. Background
Guardianship has its roots in early western civilization. 13 It be-
came firmly established in the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition with the
enactment of De Prerogativa Regis in the fourteenth century.' 4
Guardianship was a duty of the sovereign and was exercised through
the Lord Chancellor. It extended to the "idiot" who had no
understanding- the mentally retarded, and the "lunatic" who had
understanding but no reason-the mentally ill. 15 In theory, the King
was granted custody of and responsibility for the incompetent's per-
son and lands. He could keep the profits from the idiot's land, but he
could manage the lunatic's property only until the disabled individual
regained his sanity. 16 Although there was concern for the well-being
of the ward, the impetus and primary purpose of guardianship was to
preserve the property of the incompetent. 17 In this country, the
equity court assumed full jurisdiction and responsibility for the per-
son and property of incompetents, who were described as "wards of
chancery." 18 As the superior guardian, it delegated the duty of
safeguarding and promoting their interests to a guardian who was
deemed an officer of the court.19
12. See pt. III(B) infra.
13. In Egypt and ancient Greece, mentally disabled individuals were considered
to be afflicted by demons who could be exorcised by incantation or occasionally by
torture. By the fourth century B.C., this view was displaced by that of Hippocrates
who suggested that these disabilities were a natural phenomenon. Guardianship ap-
pears to have emerged under Roman law. At first, it was merely an edict that the
family of the disabled should protect his person and property. Under the Justinian
Code, a procedure was established whereby a magistrate appointed a guardian whose
duties and responsibilities were similar to those of a guardian under today's laws. Dur-
ing the middle ages, these humanitarian advances receded, and the disabled were
once again treated by exorcism. This time, however, the emphasis was on torture
rather than magic. S. Brakel & R. Rock, The Mentally Disabled and the Law 1-2
(rev. ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as The Mentally Disabled and the Law].
14. 17 Edw. 2, c. 9 (1324).
15. The Mentally Disabled and the Law, supra note 13, at 3.
16. In practice, the Chancellor delegated the Crown's responsibility to a commit-
tee that vouchsafed the custody of the incompetent, managed his property, and
periodically accounted to the chancery court. Id. at 250.
17. Accordingly, guardianship was used only for the disabled who had assets. Id.
at 3.
18. See Dexter v. Hall, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 9 (1872); McCord v. Ochiltree, 8
Blackf. 15 (Ind. 1846); Watson v. Watson, 183 Ky. 516, 209 S.W. 524 (1919); Com-
monwealth ex rel. Crombie v. McKinniss, 317 Pa. 60, 176 A. 22 (1935); Annot., 14
A.L.R. 295, 307 (1921).
19. Grayson v. Linton, 63 Idaho 695, 125 P.2d 318 (1942).
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B. Current Practice
1. Individuals Subject to Guardianship
Although the prerequisites for determining guardianship vary
among the states,20 most jurisdictions employ a two part analysis.21
The first identifies the type of disability that potentially subjects the
individual to an incompetency hearing. All states include mental ill-
ness and mental retardation. 22 The majority include physical dis-
abilities and senility, while a minority have provisions for alcoholism
and drug addiction.2 3 In addition to the enumerated infirmities,
many jurisdictions provide that a person may be declared incompe-
tent "for any other cause or incapacity." 2 4 Second, the disability
must prevent the individual from properly caring for either his prop-
erty or his person. 25
2. The Guardianship Hearing
Guardianship proceedings are characteristically informal. Some
states have no provision for the proposed ward to attend the hear-
ing. 26 Others provide that the individual is entitled to attend, 27
while a third category requires that the alleged incompetent shall at-
tend if able, unless attendance would be injurious to his health. 28 In
practice, however, the individual rarely is present. 29
20. See Guardianship & Conservatorship. supra note 6. Table I. at 11-17.
21. Id. at 3.
22. Id., Table I, at 11-17.
23. Id.
24. For example, see Mo. Ann. Stat. § 475.010(3) (Vernon Supp. 1980). which
defines a person subject to guardianship as "any person who is incapable by reason of
insanity, mental illness, imbecility, idiocy, senility . . . or other incapacity, of either
managing his property or caring for himself or both." Id. Sec also Guardianship &
Conservatorship, supra note 6, Table I. at 11-17. The Mentally Disabled and the
Law, supra note 13, at 266.
25. See Guardianship & Conservatorship, supra note 6. at 3.
26. Approximately one third of the states are in this category. See Guardianship
& Conservatorship, supra note 6. Table IV, at 27-32. It is unclear whether individu-
als in these states could attend if they so desired. But see Mental Impairment and
Legal Incompetency, supra note 8, at 83 ("right to be present is probably universally
recognized").
27. About one-half of the states have provisions for the alleged incompetent to
attend the hearing. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 13.26.105 (1972); Kan. Stat. Ann. §
59-3013 (1976); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 475.075(2) (1959). Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2619(b)
(1979). See also Guardianship & Conservatorship, supra note 6. Table IV. at 27-32.
28. See, e.g., Ind. Code Ann. § 29-1-18-19 (Burns Supp. 1979); N.Y. Mental
Hyg. Law § 77.07(b) (McKinney 1978); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 58. § 851 (West Supp.
1980); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, § 5511(a)(ii) (Purdon 1975). For a state by state listing,
see Guardianship & Conservatorship, supra note 6, Table IV, at 27-32.
29. When a third person petitioned for guardianship, the alleged incompetent
was present in court less than 8% of the time. Hortsman, supra note 9. at 235 n.81.
See also Mental Impairment and Legal Incompetency, supra note 8. at 83.
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A majority of states do not provide for the appointment of coun-
sel. 30 In some jurisdictions, the court may appoint a guardian ad
litem, 31 while other states provide that an attorney may appear on
behalf of the proposed ward. 32 Conspicuously missing from most of
these statutes, however, is a guarantee that the alleged incompetent
has a right to court-appointed counsel if he cannot afford one. 33
Rarely, in practice, is the alleged incompetent represented by either
attorney or guardian ad litem. 34
In the vast majority of the cases the hearings are ex parte. The
only persons present, therefore, are the prospective guardian, his at-
torney, and the probate judge.33 Given the absence of an adversary,
the court may dispense with the requirement of a hearing altogether.
If there is a hearing, it may, at best, last only a few minutes.30 Al-
though the statutes require that an incompetent be functionally dis-
30. See Guardianship & Conservatorship, supra note 6, Table IV, at 27-32.
31. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 26-2-42(b) (1975); Cal. Prob. Code § 1607 (West 1956);
D.C. Code Encycl. § 21-1502(B) (West 1967); R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-15-9 (1969). See
also Guardianship & Conservatorship, supra note 6, Table IV, at 27-32. A guardian
ad litem has traditionally been viewed as an officer of the court appointed to repre-
sent the interests of an infant or incompetent in litigation. See State ex rel. Keating
v. Bingham, 233 Ind. 504, 121 N.E.2d 727 (1954). There is some confusion as to
whether a guardian ad litem is to be an advocate for his client's position, similar to an
attorney, or whether he is to exercise his independent judgment in representing his
client's interests. See notes 86-92 infra and accompanying text. Compare Stanton v.
Sullivan, 62 R.I. 154, 4 A.2d 269 (1939) (guardian ad litem is not an attorney for
infant but officer appointed by court to assist it in protecting interests of infant) wtith
de Montigny v. de Montigny, 70 Wis. 2d 131, 233 N.W.2d 463 (1975) (guardian ad
litem is an attorney for the children and their interests).
32. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 45-70(c) (Vest Supp. 1980); Del. Code
Ann. tit. 12, § 3914(b) (1979); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 35-1.16(a) (Supp. 1976); Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 2111.02 (Page 1976); Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missis-
sippi, Nevada, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Vermont have no
provision for representation at the guardianship hearing. See Guardianship and Con-
servatorship, supra note 6, Table IV, at 27-32.
33. Florida is one exception to this rule and provides fbr the appointment of coun-
sel for the indigent alleged incompetent. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 744.331(4) (West Supp.
1980).
34. One study found that a guardian ad litem was appointed in about 15% of the
cases. G. Alexander & T. Lewin, The Aged and the Need for Surrogate Management
25 (1972) [hereinafter cited as The Aged and the Need for Surrogate Management].
Another concluded that the proposed ward was represented by counsel in 3% of the
proceedings. Horstman, supra note 9, at 235 n.81.
35. The petitioner, his attorney, and the judge were the only persons present in
84% of guardianship hearings. Horstman, supra note 9, at 235 n.81.
36. One leading commentator states that "[t]he hearing contemplated by the
notice sometimes takes place, sometimes does not take place, and sometimes, al-
though it occurs, is so perfunctory as not to be a hearing in any meaningful sense."
Mental Impairment and Legal Incompetency, supra note 8, at 82. See also Mitchell,
Involuntary Guardianship for Incompetents: A Strategy for Legal Services Advocates,
12 Clearinghouse Rev. 451, 454 (1978).
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abled, 37 the court rarely requires such evidence. Instead, the court
confines itself to a determination of the individual's mental capacity,
and the only evidence offered on that issue is typically a brief letter
from a physician stating that the individual is incompetent.38 The
physician is not present in court, and if he were, there would be no
one to cross-examine him. Consequently, the courts must accept this
as the only probative evidence of incapacity and, therefore, wvill con-
sistently find the individual incompetent and appoint a guardian. 39
3. Scope of Guardianship
Theoretically, a finding of incompetency need not lead to the full
deprivation of personal and property rights associated with guardian-
ship. Most jurisdictions permit the appointment of a guardian of
the person, or a guardian of the estate- sometimes called a
conservator-or both.40  Moreover, approximately one-third of the
states now provide for the appointment of a limited guardian.4 1  As
opposed to the traditional plenary guardian, a limited guardian is as-
signed only those duties that a ward is incapable of exercising 4 2
For the most part, however, a finding of incompetency leads to a
significant deprivation of personal and property rights. An incompe-
tent's ability to transact business is circumscribed. Many states revoke
the professional or occupational license of an individual under guard-
ianship. 43 In the majority of jurisdictions, a prior adjudication of in-
37. See Guardianship & Conservatorship, supra note 6. Table 1. at 11-17.
38. See Mental Impairment and Legal Incompetency, supra note 8. at 89-90.
One survey found that a physician testified in only one out of 1,000 cases. Horstman.
supra note 9, at 235 n.81. By relying on medical evidence, the courts have turned
a legal question into a medical one. Id. at 225-30. This problem has occurred in
other areas of the law that involve an individual's mental condition. See United
States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 975-79 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (the insanity defense). See
generally Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption qf Expertise: Flipping
Coins in the Courtroom, 62 Cal. L. Rev. 693 (1964); Symposium., United States v.
Brawner, 1973 Wash U.L.Q. 17.
39. Horstman, supra note 9. at 235 n.81 (less than 5% of the petitions were
dismissed on the merits).
40. Alabama does not recognize the person/property distinction. Kentucky.
Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Oklahoma do not have provisions for the
separate appointment of a personal guardian or conservator; one individual autoinati-
cally serves as both. See Guardianship & Conservatorship, supra note 6. Table I1, at
18-21. Some courts have held, however, that a guardian could not be appointed for
the estate alone. See Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 774, 791 (1966).
41. See Guardianship & Conservatorship, supra note 6. Table 11. at 18-21.
42. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 744.303 (West Supp. 1980). For a tabulation of states
that provide limited guardianship provisions, see Guardianship & Conservatorship,
supra note 6, Table II, at 18-21.
43. A sampling of these professions and occupations includes: architects. Idaho
Code § 54-305.1(d) (1979); barbers, Ky. Rev. Stat. § 317.590t1)ta) (1977) certified
public accounts, Idaho Code § 54-217(12) (1979). chauffeurs. Iowa Code Ann. §
19801 355
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competency raises a rebuttable presumption that the person lacks suf-
ficient capacity to contract or convey, thereby rendering his transac-
tions either void or voidable. 44 Although an incompetent individual
is not prohibited from making a will, it may be extremely difficult to
demonstrate that this individual had the requisite testamentary capac-
ity. 45 Personal rights are equally curtailed, An incompetent can
neither sue nor be sued except through a guardian. 46  Similarly, the
law frequently prohibits him from operating a motor vehicle, voting,
holding public office, or marrying.
47
321.177(7) (West Supp. 1980); dentists, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 61-9-14(2) (1978); funeral
directors and embalmers, Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 111 , § 73.20(e) (Smith-Hurd 1977);
insurance agents, Alaska Stat. § 21.27.020 (1966); nurses, I11. Ann. Stat. ch. 91, §
35.46(3) (Smith-Hurd 1966); physical therapists, W. Va. Code § 30-20-110(b)(5)
(1980); physicians, Ala. Code § 34-24-35(23) (1975); public officers, Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 8-48-101(7) (1980); social workers, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 9028(c) (West 1975);
veterinarians, Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 471-10(b)(5) (1976). For a complete state by state
listing of the various professions and occupations that a person under guardianship
may not practice, see The Mentally Disabled and the Law, supra note 13, at 326.
44. Although the majority rule is that an adjudication of incompetency raises only
a rebuttable presumption of incapacity at a subsequent date, a sizeable minority of
jurisdictions hold that such a finding is a conclusive determination of lack of capacity.
See Annot., 68 A.L.R. 1309, 1314 (1930). Compare Brisacher v. Tracey-Collins Trust
Co., 277 F.2d 519 (10th Cir. 1960) (majority rule) and People v. Prosser, 56 Cal.
App. 454, 205 P. 869 (1922) (same) with Jackson v. Van Dresser, 188 Tenn. 384, 219
S.W.2d 896 (1949) (minority rule) and Horton v. Lothschutz, 43 Wash. 2d 132, 260
P.2d 777 (19.53) (same). The majority position has been declared to be the "better
view." See Mental Impairment and Legal Incompetency, supra note 8, at 260-63; 2
S. Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 257 (3d ed. 1959). The older view
was that contracts of mental incompetents were void. See Reeves v. Hunter, 185
Iowa 958, 171 N.W. 567 (1919). The more modern approach calls them voidable at
the instance of the incompetent party. See Perper v. Edell, 160 Fla. 477, 35 So. 2d
387 (1948); Mental Impairment and Legal Incompetency, supra note 8, at 275-76.
See generally, Green, The Operative Effect of Mental Incompetency on Agreements
and Wills, 21 Tex. L. Rev. 554 (1943). The incompetent is, however, responsible for
the cost of necessaries fiurnished to him. 2 S. Williston, supra, § 255.
45. The test for testamentary capacity differs from that for appointment of a
guardian. See United States Bank of Am. v. Saville, 416 F.2d 265, 269 (7th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1038 (1970); 1 W. Page, Wills § 12.42 (W. Bowe & D.
Parker eds. 1960). Nevertheless, the appointment of a guardian is highly probative on
the issue and is said to establish a prima facie case against testamentary capacity. See
In re Estate of Fossa: Clark v. Raffetto, 210 Cal. App. 2d 464, 26 Cal. Rptr. 687
(1962); In re Estate of Caffney: Bradford v. Dollansky, 218 Or. 362, 345 P.2d 396
(1959); Mental Impairment and Legal Incompetency, supra note 8, at 283-93; 3 W.
Page, supra, § 29.70. For a state by state description of who may make a will, see
The Mentally Disabled and the Law, supra note 13, at 322.
46. In some states, the guardian brings the action in the name of the incompe-
tent. See Century Credit Co. v. Jones, 196 Pa. Super. Ct. 210, 173 A.2d 768 (1961).
Under the federal rules, the guardian sues in his own name. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a).
For a discussion of cases construing and applying the federal rule, see Annot., 68
A.L.R.2d 752 (1959).
47. An incompetent may be prohibited from voting by constitutional provision,
Kan. Const. art. 5, § 2, and/or statute. Ariz. Const., art. VII, § 2; Ariz. Rev. Stat.
[Vol. 49
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II. GUARDIANSHIP-PROCEDURAL ASPECTS
The significant deprivations inherent in being placed under guard-
ianship merit greater procedural protections than currently exist. In
the absence of remedial state statutes, 48 the question of the prospec-
tive ward's right to these procedural protections depends on the
mandates of due process.49 A person under guardianship suffers se-
vere restrictions and deprivations of his property and liberty.50 These
deprivations result from a finding of incompetency by a probate
court. Because these probate court proceedings are authorized and
conducted pursuant to legislative enactment, there is "state action"
sufficient to trigger application of the due process clause. 51 "Once it
is determined that due process applies, the question remains what
process is due." 52 Beyond the criminal realm, the requirements of
due process are flexible and are determined by balancing the private
Ann. § 16-101.5 (1975). The provisions dealing with competency for public office are
virtually the same as those for competency to vote and typically state that the indi-
vidual must be a qualified elector. S.C. Const.. art. I1. § 3; id. art VI. § 1. For a
state by state analysis of the prohibitions on voting, holding public office. jury ser-
vice, or operating a motor vehicle, see The Mentally Disabled and the Law, supra
note 13, Table 9.4, at 333-39. For a similar analysis concerning prohibitions on mar-
riage, see id., Table 7. 1, at 240-43. See also Mental Impairment and Legal Incompe-
tency, supra note 8, at 260-369.
48. See the Model Statute proposed in Guardianship & Conservatorship. supra
note 6, at 78-167, which provides for extensive procedural safeguards including the
right to counsel, jury trial, proof beyond reasonable doubt, and periodic review.
49. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
50. See notes 43-47 supra and accompanying text.
51. The "state action" requirement of the fourteenth amendment is the equiva-
lent of action " under color' of [state] law" found in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). United
States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794-95 n.7 (1966). There is no precise formula for
determining the quantum of state action that gives rise to a c-ause of action. Each
case depends upon the particular facts and circumstances involved. See Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722-24 (1961). One recurring set of cir-
cumstances in which color of state law has not been found and that presents a surface
similarity to the state involvement in guardianship proceedings is the self-help repos-
session cases under the Uniform Commercial Code or other similar statutes. Flagg
Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Fletcher v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust
Nat'l Bank, 496 F.2d 927 (1st Cir.), cert. denied. 419 U.S. 1001 (1974); Shirley v.
State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739 (2d Cir.), cert. denied. 419 U.S. 1009 (1974). Adams
v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied. 419
U.S. 1006 (1974). The courts have held that, notwvithstanding the existence of state
statutes authorizing self-help, private individuals acting pursuant thereto do not act
under color of state law. Although the same could arguably be said of private guard-
ians, the distinction is that the statutory authorization for self-help is merely du-
plicative of valid, existing, private remedies. See Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493
F.2d 739, 741-42 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974); Annot.. 32 A.L.R.
Fed. 431, 437-38 (1977). By contrast, there is no common law, non-statutor' method
for an individual to be appointed guardian, other than by resort to the courts. See
notes 14-18 supra and accompanying text.
52. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471. 481 (1972).
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FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
interest involved, the risk of its erroneous deprivation through the
current procedures, and the burden that the additional procedures
would entail.53
Because of the severe limitations that guardianship imposes on per-
sonal and economic freedom, an individual has a significant interest in
not being placed under guardianship unless he is truly incapable of
managing his affairs. Moreover, an individual under guardianship
bears the stigma of having been labeled incompetent.5 4 This can be
devastating to an individual's sense of personal dignity,55 especially to
those, such as the elderly, who once had keen minds and were pro-
ductive citizens.
The state, under its parens patriae power, has a legitimate concern
in protecting the interests of those who are incapable of taking care of
themselves. 56 As opposed to civil commitments, however, in which
the state has an additional police power interest in confining those
mentally ill individuals who are dangerous, 57 the sole justification for
guardianship is to assure the well being of the ward. In discharging
its responsibility, therefore, the state has an interest in not erecting
too many obstacles to the appointment of a guardian.
More onerous procedures for appointment of a guardian may not
be socially desirable, and this consideration would weigh against a
wholesale extension of due process protections. 58 Private guardians
53. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (termination of
social security disability benefit payments); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 577-79
(1975) (public school suspension); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)
(parole revocation).
54. For cases in which stigmatization was an important factor in deciding whether
due process was required, see Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574-75 (1975); Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972); Wisconsin v. Costantineau, 400 U.S. '133,
437 (1971). But see Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 601 (1979) ("what is truly 'stig-
matizing' is the symptomatology of a mental or emotional illness"); Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979) ("[o]ne who is suffering from a debilitating mental
illness and in need of treatment is neither wholly at liberty nor free of stigma").
55. The Aged and the Need for Surrogate Management, supra note 34, at 2:
Horstman, supra note 9, at '231. See also Regan, Protective Services for the Elderly:
Commitment, Guardianship and Alternatives, 13 Wim. & Mary L. Rev. 569, 607
(1972).
56. See Vargyas, supra note 5, at 342.
57. Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Il, 87 Hlarv.
L. Rev. 1190, 1222-45 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
58. In Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979), the Court held that parents could
"volunteer" 'their children to a mental institution virtually without any due process
safeguards for the minors. One factor that influenced the Court against requiring a
plenary hearing was the state's significant interest in not imposing unnecessary pro-
cedural obstacles that may discourage the families of the mentally ill from seeking
psychiatric assistance. Id. at 605. A significant distinction, however, between Parham
and the guardianship context is that, in Parham, the parents of the child, as the
child's natural guardian, presumptively act in the child's best interest. Id. at 602-03.
By contrast, until a person is appointed guardian, the law does not presume that
there is any affinity between the prospective guardian and ward.
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are typically compensated out of the ward's estate for undertaking
their responsibilities. 59 When the ward's estate is substantial, a more
formalized hearing max, not deter the prospective guardian from peti-
tioning for guardianship. The recent emergence of public guardian-
ship provisions permitting the state to become guardian, however,
indicates that currently there are not sufficient numbers of individuals
willing to become guardians. 60 When the ward has a meager estate,
a more complicated or adversarial procedure may well deter the
would-be guardian from petitioning. This in turn would require the
state to assume the burden and expense of public guardianship. In
those jurisdictions without public guardianship provisions, the dis-
abled individual might not be provided the benefit and protection of
a guardian. 6'
Another factor to be considered in deciding what process is due is
the likelihood of erroneous deprivation of an individual's personal lib-
erty through the procedures employed. One study concluded that
over 95% of the guardianship petitions resulted in the appointment of
59. In most states, a guardian receives *'reasonable" compensation. See. e.g,.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 34-810 (1977) Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 14. § 2847 (1974). In Alabama.
the compensation of a guardian is a fixed percentage of the ward's estate. Ala. Code §
26-5-16 (1975). See also Guardianship & Conservatorship. supra note 6. Table V. at
33-37; 39 Am. Jur. 2d Guardian and Ward § 186 (1968).
60. Thirteen states have provisions for the appointment of a public guardian. See
Guardianship & Conservatorship, supra note 6, Table V. at 33. 36-37. These stat-
utes typically provide that a public guardian shall not be appointed if a suitable
private guardian is available and willing to assume the responsibilities. See. e.g . Ala.
Code § 26-2-50 (1975); Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 8006 (West Supp. 19S0. Me. Rev,
Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 3649 (Supp. 1980), Generally the public guardian is funded by
either the county, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14-5601B (1975). or the state. E.g:
Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 91 , § 735 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-81). See Guardianship &
Conservatorship, supra note 6, Table V, at 36-37. For an evaluation of public guard-
ianship in Minnesota, the first state to have such a provision. see Levy. Protecting
the Mentally Retarded: An Empirical Survey and Evaluation of the Establishment of
State Guardianship in Minnesota, 49 Minn. L. Rev. 821 h1965. See also Hodgson.
Guardianship of Mentally Retarded Persons: Three Approaches to a Long Neglected
Problem, 37 Alb. L. Rev. 407, 410-23 (1973).
61. No social policy considerations weigh in favor of deprih ing an incapacitated
individual of the protections of guardianship. In those states with public guardianship
provisions, however, it mav be more beneficial from the \vard's perspective to be
under public rather than private guardianship. Public guardianship protects the
ward's property from the excessive costs of private guardianship. In addition, because
a public guardian is usually a social service agency. it may be in a better position
professionally than a private guardian to assess the \ward's needs and avoid 05er-
protection. See Mental Impairment and Legal Incompetenc.Y supra note 8. at 106-
07. On the other hand, because a public guardian has custody of many ards. some
individuals may inadvertently slip into the interstices, a situation less likely, to occur
with a private guardian. See Parham v. J. R,. 442 U.S. 5S84. 619 11979 %% bell a state
ward was committed to a mental hospital, the Court acknoltdged risk of the child
being "" lost in the shuffle' ").
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a guardian. 62 In the civil commitment context, studies have found
that stricter procedural requirements decreased the number of com-
mitments.63 If this reduced number of civil commitments more accu-
rately reflects the number of individuals who should be committed,
then judicially increased procedural safeguards would have a similar
beneficial effect in the guardianship sphere.
A. Notice
Virtually ,every jurisdiction requires that notice be given to the al-
legedly incapacitated individual and his family. 64  Most jurisdictions
require notice seven to fourteen days prior to the hearing.66 Fre-
quently, however, the individual is simply sent a notice of the hear-
ing 66 and is not advised of the serious legal consequences of an ad-
judication of incompetency. Even when a copy of the petition accom-
panies the notice of hearing, the alleged incompetent is still not effec-
tively apprised of the underlying facts because the petition, in in-
scrutable legalese, merely recites the statutory requirements. 7
To meet the requirements of due process, notice given to in-
terested parties must be reasonably calculated under all the cir-
cumstances to apprise them of the pending action and of their oppor-
tunity to be heard.68 Notice must particularize the specific acts or
conduct that form the basis of the suit. 69 Accordingly, in commit-
ment proceedings, courts have required notice of the purpose of the
proceedings, the alleged facts that form the basis for the proposed
commitment, and the possible consequences of an adverse determina-
tion. 70 There is no reason why these requirements should not also
62. See note 39 supra.
63. See Cyr, The Role and Functions of the Attorney in the Civil Commitment
Process: The District of Columbia's Approach, 6 J. Psych. & L. 107, 115-18 (1978);
Zander, Civil Commitment in Wisconsin: The Impact of Lessard v. Schmidt, 1976
Wis. L. Rev. 503, 553. Compare Dix, Acute Psychiatric Hospitalization of the Men-
tally Ill in the Metropolis: An Empirical Study, 1968 Wash. U.L.Q. 485, 540 (2 of
1700 cases resulted in patient's release) with Perlin, Representing Individual in the
Commitment and Guardianship Process, in Legal Rights, supra note 9, at 497, 510
(20% committed).
64. Alabama, South Dakota, and in some instances, Texas, however, do not have
statutory notice provisions. See Guardianship & Conservatorship, supra note 6, Table
III, at 23-26.
65. Id. at 5.
66. Id., Table III, at 23-26.
67. Mitchell, supra note 36, at 453-54.
68. See Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550-51 (1965); Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
69. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33 (1967); Wagner v. Little Rock School Dist.,
373 F. Supp. 876, 881 (E.D. Ark. 1973).
70. See Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439 (S.D. Iowa 1976); Kendall v.
True, 391 F. Supp, 413 (W.D. Ky. 1975); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D.
Ala. 1974); Bell v. Wayne County Gen. Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D. Mich.
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apply to guardianship proceedings. Moreover, unless notice is written
in clear language, it should not be considered sufficient to inform
allegedly incompetent individuals of the nature and the purpose of
the hearing. 71
B. Right to Counsel
It is imperative that counsel be appointed for all individuals facing
guardianship. 72 The prospective ward is frequently disabled and in-
capable of adequately protecting his interests during the course of a
guardianship hearing. As noted earlier, a majority of states permit
representation by counsel or guardian ad litem, although in most
jurisdictions there is no mechanism for appointment of counsel as a
matter of course. 73 There may, however, be a constitutional right to
counsel, grounded in due process, in guardianship hearings. As inter-
preted, the sixth amendment guarantees all indigent defendants the
right to appointed counsel at the critical stages of criminal proceed-
ings. 74 Relying on the due process clause, the Supreme Court in In
Re Gault 75 extended the right to appointed counsel to juvenile delin-
quency hearings. Rejecting the criminal-civil distinction, the Court
examined the substance of delinquency proceedings and concluded
that, notwithstanding the benign motives of the state in confining the
juvenile, basic fairness dictated that the juvenile be entitled to legal
representation because he was subjected to a possible loss of lib-
erty. 7 6
1974). See also Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (requiring
the names of all persons who may testify at hearing for commitment and the sub-
stance of their proposed testimony), vacated on other grounds and remanded per
curiam, 414 U.S. 473 (1974).
71. See Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 388 (M.D. Ala. 1974 Litwack, The
Role of Counsel in Civil Commitment Proceedings: Emerging Problems. 62 Cal. L.
Rev. 816, 821-22 (1974).
72. Guardianship & Conservatorship, supra note 6. Model Statute § 31ttjal(ii, at
134; Task Panel on Legal and Ethical Issues of the President's Commission on Mental
Health, Mental Health and Human Rights (Feb. 15. 1978). reprinted in 20 Ariz. L.
Rev. 49, 76-77 (1978). But see Rud v. Dahl, 578 F.2d 674 (7th Cir. 1978).
73. See notes 30-34 supra and accompanying text. In those jurisdictions that pro-
vide for the appointment of counsel, courts have liberally construed the provisions to
protect the rights of alleged incompetents. See Trapnell v. Smith. 131 Ga. App. 254.
205 S.E.2d 875 (1974); State ex rel. Koch v. Vanderburgh Probate Court. 246 Ind.
139, 203 N.E.2d 525 (1965); Annot., 87 A.L.R.2d 950 (1963).
74. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (misdemeanors for which de-
fendant faces possibility of confinement); Gideon v. Wainwright. 372 U.S. 3351 (1963)
(felonies). This right to counsel attaches at every "'critical stage" of a criminal pro-
ceeding. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (preliminary hearing); United States
v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (pretrial lineup).
75. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
76. Id. at 34-42.
1980]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Courts applying the Gault rationale to individuals facing other
grievous losses of liberty have concluded that the right to appointed
counsel attaches to neglect or dependency proceedings that could re-
sult in either the removal of the child from parental custody 77 or the
permanent termination of parental rights, 78 to adoption proceedings
that may result in the involuntary termination of parental rights, 79
and to proceedings to review foster care status.80 The right to coun-
sel has also been extended to the related area of involuntary com-
mitment proceedings because of the possibility of indefinite commit-
ment and the associated stigmatization. 8 1 Similarly, the loss of liber-
ties, both personal and economic, and the stigmatization associated
with guardianship are significant losses. That the state, as parens pat-
riae, is acting out of concern for the alleged incompetent neither di-
minishes nor legitimates these deprivations.
One significant difference, however, is that, in cases that have
applied the Gault rationale, there is usually a state appointed pros-
ecuting attorney. 82  When the state, through its legal counsel, mar-
shals its knowledge and expertise against an individual standing alone,
courts understandably view the situation as fundamentally unfair if
counsel is not appointed to represent the individual. If, however,
77. See Cleaver v. Wilcox, 499 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1974); Danforth v. State Dep't
of Health and Welfare, 303 A.2d 794 (Me. 1973); In re B., 30 N.Y.2d 352, 285
N.E.2d 288, 334 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1972); In re Welfare of Myricks, 85 Wash. 2d 252,
533 P.2d 841 (1975).
78. See Crist v. New Jersey Div. Youth & Family Servs., 135 N.J. Super. 573,
343 A.2d 815 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975); In re Welfare of Luscier, 84 Wash. 2d
135, 524 P.2d 906 (1974); State ex rel. Lemaster v. Oakley, 203 S.E.2d 140 (W, Va.
1974).
79. See In re Adoption of R.I., 455 Pa. 29, 312 A.2d 601 (1973).
80. See In re K., 82 Misc. 2d 983, 372 N.Y.S.2d 35! (Fain. Ct. 1975). For other
contexts and cases reviewing the right to counsel in proceedings involving a possible
loss or termination of parental rights, see Annot., 80 A.L.R.3d 1141 (1977).
81. Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968); Bell v. Wayne County
Gen. Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Lessard v. Schmidt, 379 F.
Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated on other grounds and remanded per curiam,
421 U.S. 957 (1975); In re Quesnell, 83 Wash. 2d 224, 517 P.2d 568 (1978)(en bane);
State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d 109 (W. Va. 1974); see Dorsey v, Sol-
omon, 435 F. Supp. 725 (D. Md. 1977); Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039
(E.D. Pa. 1975), vacated as moot and remanded, 431 U.S. 119 (1977). But see
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979). See generally Comment, A Constitutional
Right to Court Appointed Counsel for the Involuntarily Committed Mentally Ill:
Beyond the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 5 Seton Hall L. Rev. 64 (1973); Annot., 87
A.L.R.2d 950 (1963).
82. See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377
U.S. 1 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Heryford v. Parker, 396
F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968); In re Welfare of Luscier, 84 Wash. 2d 135, 524 P.2d 906
(1974); State ex rel. Lemaster v. Oakley, 203 S.E.2d 140 (W. Va. 1974).
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there is no prosecuting attorney, the scales are not inexorably tilted
against the individual and counsel, therefore, is not as necessarvA1
Initally, this factor militates against recognition of a constitutional
right to appointment of counsel because the prospective ward gener-
ally faces, not a state prosecutor, but a private individual who may or
may not be represented by an attorney. If, however, the right to
counsel is granted to adjust the inherent imbalance of experience and
expertise between the parties and not simply because of the presence
of the state attorney, the same imbalance must be recognized when a
disabled person faces a healthy petitioning party. The absence of a
prosecuting attorney should not be a reason to den) prospective
wards a right to counsel.
The appointment of counsel would inevitably discourage some indi-
viduals from petitioning for guardianship. This would be particularly
true in an adversarial hearing at which the attorney opposes appoint-
ment of a guardian. In other situations, however, the appointment of
a guardian would be a certainty, and the hearing would focus on the
less controversial issues of the extent of guardianship and the de-
velopment of a prescriptive treatment plan.' This hearing would seldom
be adversarial, and counsel would probably be welcomed. In any
event, the ward's inability to effectively advocate for himself, coupled
with his need to have his interests vigorously represented, are com-
pelling reasons to require appointment of counsel and outweigh any
adverse effect upon the number of individuals willing to petition for
guardianship. 85
If counsel is required at guardianship proceedings, the question
arises as to his proper role. In the related civil commitment area, a
controversy exists between those who believe that an attorney should
represent his client's best interests and those who believe that coun-
sel should advocate his client's position, regardless of the inherent
wisdom of that position. 86 The former view arises from a number of
83. The Supreme Court, noting the absence of a prosecutor, has held that rep-
resentation by counsel was not required. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli. 411 U.S. 778
(1973) (probation revocation); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parole revo-
cation). But see Brunetti, The Right to Counsel, Waiver Thereof. and Effective Assis-
tance of Counsel in Civil Commitment Proceedings. 29 Sw. L.J. 684, 693-95 (1975)
(arguing that individual facing commitment is entitled to representation by counsel,
notwithstanding that majority of states do not require state prosecutor).
84. See pt. III infra.
85. But see Rud v. Dahl, 578 F.2d 674 (7th Cir. 1978). The court in Rud held
that counsel was not constitutionally required at guardianship proceedings because
relaxed procedural and evidentiarv rules did not require skills of legal counsel; the
liberty interest at stake was "Iless significant" than other proceedings in which the
presence of an attorney has been mandated; and finally, the costs associated wvith
mandatory appointment of counsel vould undermine one of the essential purposes of
the proceeding-the protection of the incompetent's limited resources. Id. at 679.
86. Andalman & Chambers, Effective Counsel for Persons Facing Civil Commit-
flent: A Survey, a Polemic, and a Proposal, 45 Miss. L.J. 43, 89-90 (1974); Cohen,
1980]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
factors characteristic of both commitment and guardianship hearings.
First, because his client's sanity is an issue, an attorney may believe
that his client is unable to decide rationally what is in his best in-
terest.87 Moreover, an attorney may feel awkward in advocating his
client's wishes because the client appears or acts in a bizarre man-
ner.88 Finally, because the ostensible purpose of the proceeding is to
help his client, he may believe that he need not actively oppose the
petition.89
These apparent justifications are fundamentally at odds with the
historic role of counsel as a zealous advocate for his client.90 When
the issue has been litigated in the commitment context, the courts
have held that the presence of a guardian ad litem is insufficient to
satisfy the requirement of representation by counsel and have ruled
that counsel, if request6d, must take an adversary position. , ' The
role of an attorney should be the same in guardianship hearings.92
C. Review
The statutes of virtually every state have procedures to terminate
guardianship, which can be invoked by the disabled person and
others interested in his welfare. 93 Only ten states, however, require
regular court review of private guardianships and conservatorships .
4
The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 44 Tex. L.
Rev. 424 (1966); Dix, Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill in Wisconsin: A Need for a
Reexamination, 51 Marq. L. Rev. 1 (1967); Litwack, supra note 71, at 838-39; De-
velopments, supra note 57, at 1288-91; Note, The Role of Counsel in the Civil Comi-
mitment Process: A Theoretical Framework, 84 Yale L.J. 1540 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as The Role of Counsel].
87. See The Role of Counsel, supra note 86, at 1542.
88. Litwack, supra note 71, at 827-31.
89. See In re Quesnell, 83 Wash. 2d 224, 232-35, 5t7 P.2d 568, 574-75 (1973) (en
banc); Perlin, supra note 63, at 497-505.
90. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967); Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45, 71 (1932); ABA Canons of Professional Ethics No. 7.
91. See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on
other grounds and remanded per curiam, 414 U.S. 473 (1974); In re Quesnell, 83
Wash. 2d 224, 517 P.2d 568 (1973) (en banc); State ex rel. Memmel v. Mundy, 75
Wis. 2d 276, 249 N.W.2d 573 (1977).
92. Counsel for an allegedly incapacitated individual must -represent zealously
that individual's legitimate interests." Guardianship & Conservatorship, supra note
6, Model Statute § 33, at 141. See also Mickenberg, The Silent Clients: Legal and
Ethical Considerations in Representing Severely and Profoundly Retarded Individu-
als, 31 Stan. L. Rev. 625 (1979).
93. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 13.26.125(b) (1972); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §
330.1637 (Supp. 1979); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 3A:6-43 (West 1953 & Supp. 1979). For a
complete list, see Guardianship & Conservatorship, supra note 6, Table VI, at 38-41.
94. Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan,
Nevada, and North Carolina provide for periodic review of guardianship. See Guard-
ianship & Conservatorship, supra note 6, Table VI, at 38-41.
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In general, these statutes require the guardian to file reports on the
condition of his ward and the need for continued guardianship. 95
Only Arizona unequivocally requires the guardian to re-petition for
guardianship through a formal proceeding at periodic intervals. 96
Periodic review is essential. Although some individuals completely
regain their competency, restoration proceedings seldom occur.9 7
Periodic review would ensure that guardianship would continue only
as long as necessary. Other benefits would also accrue. Although cur-
rent procedures require a guardian to file periodic accountings, these
reports are confined solely to the ward's financial status. 98 The court
cannot determine from an accounting if the needs of the ward are
being met.9 9 A periodic review would ensure that, as the ward's
condition changes, the court would be able to reassess the continued
necessity of restrictions already imposed and the appropriateness of
the treatment plan.100 It would also give the court the opportunity to
determine if the guardian has been diligent in the performance of his
duties. Periodic review deserves, and has received, vigorous en-
dorsement.' 0 '
In addition, a constitutional right to a periodic review may exist. In
an analogous context, the Supreme Court has emphasized that com-
mitment to a mental institution must be justified by a legitimate state
interest, and when the reasons for confinement no longer exist, the
individual must be released. 102 Proceeding on this assumption,
courts have reasoned that, because the state has the initial burden of
justifying commitment, it must periodically demonstrate that the
reasons for commitment still exist. 10 3
A division of opinion exists, however, on whether the state can
require the patient to request a rehearing.104 The better view re-
95. Id.
96. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-547(B) (1974 & Supp. 1980).
97. Mental Impairment and Legal Incompetency, supra note S. at 93, 247.
98. See, e.g., Cal. Prob. Code §§ 1550, 1553 (1956 & Supp. 1979); Mass. Ann.
Laws ch. 205, § 1.5 (Michie/Law Co-op 1969 & Supp. 1980).
99. Mental Impairment and Legal Incompetency, supra note 8. at 92-93. 246-47.
100. If the ward's condition has improved, a less restrictive form of guardianship
might be devised. For a discussion of the wvard's right to limited guardianship, see
pt. III(A) infra.
101. See Guardianship & Conservatorship. supra note 6. Model Statute § 15 &
Comment, at 101-03.
102. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563. 574-75 (1975). Jackson '. Indiana,
406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
103. See Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113 (D. Ha\-aii 1976). Fasulo '.
Arafeh, 173 Conn. 473, 378 A.2d 553 (1977).
104. Compare Fasulo v. Arafeh, 173 Conn. 473. 378 A.2d 5.53 (1977 (periodic
review must be initiated by the state) twith Dorsey v. Solomon. 435 F. Supp. 725 (D.
Md. 1977) (the criminally insane have no right to periodic review), modified. 604
F.2d 271 (4th Cir. 1979) and Suzuki v. Quisenberry. 411 F. Supp. 1113 (D. Hawaii
1976) (the patient can be required to initiate review).
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quires the party seeking to continue the commitment to initiate the
review. Without this periodic reassessment, many individuals who no
longer require commitment would remain institutionalized due to a
limited knowledge of the release procedures-a problem exacerbated
by their mental condition.10 5 The justification for confinement having
ceased, their continued commitment would be unconstitutional with-
out a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to a review.' 00 This
waiver would be unlikely in view of their mental condition. An equal
protection argument may also be asserted. The lack of a periodic re-
view unlawfully differentiates between an individual prior to com-
mitment, who has a full panoply of procedural protections before his
liberty can be restricted, and the individual after commitment, who
enjoys these protections only if he takes the additional step of
requesting a review. 10 7 These arguments apply with equal force to
those subjected to guardianship and compel the conclusion that
periodic review initiated by the guardian is necessary to continue
guardianship.
The question arises as to the form of the periodic review. Concep-
tually, it should entail all the formalities of the initial hearing. 10 8
Nevertheless, the knowledge that an annual judicial proceeding
would be necessary nay discourage many would-be guardians from
petitioning for guardianship. A balancing of interests suggests that the
guardian be required, at the least, to file detailed periodic reports
with the court and the ward's attorney, with the understanding that
either has the right to request a formal hearing.
III. GUARDIANSHIP -SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS
A. Least Restrictive Alternatfve
In approximately two thirds of the states, the ward is placed under
plenary guardianship 109 and loses significant personal rights. 110 The
remaining states provide a form of limited guardianship that per-
mits the ward to retain a degree of self-determination."' The pro-
bate court, however, may be under no statutory compulsion to appoint
a limited guardian if the incapacitated person does not need a plenary
105. See Fasulo v. Arafeh, 173 Conn. 473, 378 A.2d 553 (1977): Developments,
supra note 57, at 1397-98.
106. Waiver of constitutional rights must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 4.58
(1938).
107. See Developments, supra note 57, at 1387.
108. Id. at 1394.
109. For a complete list, see Guardianship & Conservatorship, supra note 6,
Table II, at 18-21.
110. See notes 43-47 supra and accompanying text.
111. See Guardianship & Conservatorship, supra note 6, Table II, at 18-21.
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guardian because many of the statutes provide that the court "may"
appoint a limited guardian.112
The intrusiveness and inflexibility of plenary guardianship provi-
sions have been criticized. 113 Numerous individuals under guardian-
ship are capable of handling many of the decisions that fall to the
guardian. Yet, given the all or nothing wording of most statutes, the
need for some assistance translates into a total abrogation of the dis-
abled individual's rights. This total divestiture of self-management, in
turn, increases dysfunction. 114 In essence, plenary guardianship be-
comes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Moreover, the serious deprivations of
rights associated with plenary guardianship discourage some from
seeking "guardianship on behalf of individuals who need only moder-
ate protection." 115 In practice, therefore, full guardianship is both
overinclusive and underinclusive. A remedy" lies in limited guardian-
ship provisions that set forth the guardian's specific duties and re-
sponsibilities and reserve all other rights to the incapacitated indi-
vidual. 1 6
A constitutional basis for granting the guardian only those duties
that the ward is plainly incapable of performing depends upon the
applicability of the least restrictive alternative principle. The most re-
nowned formulation appears in Shelton v. Tucker,117 in which the
Supreme Court stated that
[elven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and sub-
stantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly
112. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 744.303(1) (West Supp. 1980). Idaho Code § 56-
239(d) (Supp. 1980); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 3512 (Supp. 1980).
113. The Aged and the Need for Surrogate Management, supra note 34. at 3, 137;
The Mentally Disabled and the Law, supra note 13, at 264; Regan, supra note 55. at
608.
114. See The Aged and the Need for Surrogate Management. supra note 34. at
137.
115. International League of Societies for the Mentally Handicapped. Symposium
on Guardianship of the Mentally Retarded 11 (1969). "'[l]mportant and appealing pol-
icy goals are in tension in the guardianship area. The first policy goal is protection
against exploitation of mentally [disabled] citizens. The second goal is freedom of the
mentally [disabled] citizen, with opportunity to develop as an independent member
of the community. Extreme protection can sometimes be more onerous than moder-
ate exploitation." Kindred, Guardianship and Limitations Upon Capacity. in The
President's Committee on Mental Retardation, The Mentally Retarded Citizen and
the Law 62, 66 (1976) (footnote omitted).
116. See the Model Statute proposed in Guardianship & Conservatorship. supra
note 6, at 101-03, which provides that the court impose the least restrictive alterna-
tive necessary to enable the partially disabled person to meet the essential require-
ments of his physical health or safety and to manage his financial resources. Id.
Model Statute § 15, at 101-03. A model statute is also proposed in The Aged and the
Need for Surrogate Management, supra note 34, at 141. It provides for a sliding
scale of interference with an individual's right to manage his personal affairs. In par-
ticular, this model act creates three categories of impairment and an appropriate
surrogate manager for each. Id. at 144-53. But see Uniform Probate Code (no provi-
sion for appointment of limited guardian).
117. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
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stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more
narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment must be
viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same
basic purpose." 8
The Court has applied the least restrictive alternative analysis to in-
validate laws that have restricted the rights to vote, 119 to travel,' 20
and to procreate. 12' It recently used this principle to strike down a
zoning ordinance with an overly restrictive definition of "family." 122
Although the Court has yet to consider the doctrine in the mental
health context, lower courts have extensively applied this doctrine. It
first emerged in Lake v. Cameron,123 in whiich the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia construed a statute to require investiga-
tion of less drastic alternatives than involuntary commitment to a
mental institution. The same court raised the statutory right to one of'
constitutional dimensions in Covington v. Harris,124 a case involving
an intra-hospital transfer. A plethora of subsequent cases have held
that the massive curtailment of liberty inherent in the very nature of'
civil commitment requires a showing that involuntary hospitalization
is the least restrictive alternative consistent with the needs of the
person to be committed. 125 This analysis has also been applied to the
118. Id. at 488. The least restrictive alternative had its genesis in cases dealing
with the commerce clause. See Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 3,19, 354
(1951); Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 513-17 (1924); Struve, The
Less-Restrictive-Alternative Principle and Economic Due Process, 80 Harv. L. Rev.
1463 (1967); Wormuth & Mirkin, The Doctrine of the Reasonable Alternative, 9 Utah
L. Rev. 254 (1964).
119. O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 533-35 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring);
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 95-97 (1965).
120. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 267-70 (1974); Vlandis v.
Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 451-52 (1973).
121. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 642-49 (1974). See gener-
ally Developments, supra note 57, at 1245-48.
122. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
123. 364 F.2d 657, 660-61 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
124. 419 F.2d 617, 623-25 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
125. See J.L. v. Parham, 412 F. Supp. 112, 139 (M.D. Ga. 1976), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F.
Supp. 378, 392 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 501-02 (D.
Minn. 1974), aff'd in part, vacated in part and remanded, 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir.
1977); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1095-96 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on
other grounds and remanded per curiam, 414 U.S. 473 (1974); Dixon v. Attorney
Gen., 325 F. Supp. 966, 973-74 (M.D. Pa. 1971). But see Eubanks v. Clarke, 434 F.
Supp. 1022, 1028 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Snpp. 439, 452-53
(S.D. Iowa 1976); Davis v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196, 1203 (N.D. Ohio 1974);
State v. Sanchez, 80 N.M. 438, 441, 457 P.2d 370, 373 (1969), appeal dismissed, 396
U.S. 276 (1970); Kesselbrenner v. Anonymous, 33 N.Y.2d 161, 165-66, 305 NE.2d
903, 905, 350 N.Y.S.2d 889, 892 (1973).
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commitment of the mentally retarded. 126 Indeed, the principle is so
well established that it has been incorporated into the commitment
statutes of many states. 127
The disadvantage of reliance upon the least restrictive alternative is
that its application by the Supreme Court has been less than uniform.
Even in the prototypical first amendment context, the Court has vac-
illated in its use. 128  Moreover, the Court specifically rejected the
doctrine as a means of ameliorating the conditions of confinement of
pretrial detainees in Bell v. olfish. 129 In Bell, the Court refused to
consider the doctrine because it was not alleged that any of the condi-
tions of confinement were unduly restrictive of any express constitu-
tional guarantee other than the rudiments of due process.130 Guard-
ianship, by contrast, is an encroachment on such recognized and fun-
damental personal liberties as the rights to marry. 131 and to vote. 132
Although not as significant, the right to hold and convey property, 133
the right to contract, i3 4 and the right to engage in the practice of a
126. See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. 446 F. Supp. 1295 IE.D.
Pa. 1977), aff'd in part, rev'd in part and remanded en bane, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir.
1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 2984 (1980); Gary W. v. Louisiana, 437 F. Supp.
1209, 1216-17 (E.D. La. 1976), aff'd, 601 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1979); Saville v. Tread-
way, 404 F. Supp. 430, 437 (M.D. Tenn. 1974); Wyatt v. Sticknev, 344 F. Supp.
387, 396 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part, remanded in part and decision reserved
in part sub norn. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
127. See, e.g., Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 334-60 (1976 & Supp. 1979); Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann. tit. 34, § 2251(7) (1964); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 123, § 8 (MichielLaw Co-op.
1972 & Supp. 1980); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 253A.02 (West 1971 & Supp. 1980). Tenn.
Code Ann. § 33-604(d) (Supp. 1980); Utah Code Ann. § 64-7-366) (Supp. 1979). Va.
Code § 37.1-67-3 (Supp. 1980).
128. See L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 12-30. at 72-23 (1978); Note.
Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 Yale L.J. 464, 465 (1969) ("rhetoric
of less drastic means does not provide a trustworthy guide to what the Court is
actually doing with the concept"). Compare Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488
(1960) ('[t]he breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less
drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose") with United States v. Robel,
389 U.S. 258, 267 (1968) (not "our function to determine whether an industrial se-
curity screening program exhausts the possible alternatives to the statute under re-
view.").
129. 441 U.S. 520 (1979). Lower courts had applied the Shelton principle by en-
joining onerous prison conditions that were not the least restrictive means of ensur-
ing the presence of pretrial detainees at trial. See Inmates of Suffolk County jail v.
Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 686 (D. Mass. 1973). aff'd, 494 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 977 (1974); Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 138
(N.D. Cal. 1972); Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182. 1192-93 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
130. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 534 (1979).
131. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
132. Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975).
133. Arkansas Stove Co. v. State, 94 Ark. 27, 125 S.V. 1001 (1910Y Carolina
Beach Fishing Pier, Inc. v. Carolina Beach, 274 N.C. 362, 163 S.E.2d 363 (1968).
134. See Florida Accountants Ass'n v. Dandelake, 98 So. 2d 323 (Fla. 1957) (en
banc); Blount v. Smith, 12 Ohio St. 2d 41, 231 N.E.2d 301 (1967). In contrast, some
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business or occupation 135 are all curtailed by appointment of a guard-
ian. 136 Every facet of a ward's life is subject to regulation and con-
trol by the guardian. Guardianship is a massive curtailment of the
right to privacy, "the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive
of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." 13 7
The least restrictive alternative is similar in approach to strict
scrutiny under the equal protection clause; both subject legislation
burdening fundamental rights to active and critical analysis.'138 Strict
scrutiny is also triggered by legislation involving a suspect classifica-
tion, such as race, 139 alienage, 140 and national origin.' 41 A suspect
class is one "saddled with such 'disabilities, or subjected to such a
history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a posi-
tion of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection
from the majoritarian political process." 142 Several courts have either
expressly or implicitly indicated that mental retardation constitutes a
suspect classification; 143 this determination could logically be ex-
courts have suggested that freedom of contract is not a fundamental constitutional
right. See United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Parsons, 147 Miss. 335, 112 So. 469
(1927); State v. Gateway Mortuaries, Inc., 87 Mont. 225, 287 P. 156 (1930)
135. Dent v. West Virgnia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889); Weill v. State, 250 Ala. 328, 34
So. 2d 132 (1948).
136. Unlike the right., to marry and vote, the regulation of contracts, property,
and business occupations do not invoke strict scrutiny analysis under the equal pro-
tection clause. See Pollard v. Cockrell, 578 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1978).
137. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing); see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972);
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
138. Fundamental rights include the right to marry, Zablocki v. Rcdhail, 434 U.S.
374 (1978), the right to procreate, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S.
535 (1942), the right to vote, Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966), first amendment interests, Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92
(1972), the right to a criminal appeal, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. J2 (1956), the right
to travel interstate. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). See also Brenneman
v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 138 (N.D. Cal. 1972); President's Committee on
Mental Retardation, The Mentally Retarded Citizen and the Law 490 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as The Mentally Retarded Citizen].
139. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). See generally Gunther, The Suprenme
Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1972).
140. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). See generally Gunther, supra
note 139, at 1.
141. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948). See generally Gunther, supra note
139, at 1.
142. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
143. See Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F. Supp. 946, 958-59 (E.D. Pa. 1975); In re
G. H., 218 N.W.2d 441. 446-47 (N.D. 1974); cf. Frederick L. v. Thomas, 408 F.
Supp. 832, 836 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (handicapped students ".re not a suspect class [but]
they do exhibit some of the essential characteristics of suspect classes"), aff'd, 557
F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1977). But see Frontiero v. Richardson 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973);
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tended to the other groups subject to guardianship. Thus, the power-
lessness of incompetents as a class, coupled with the wholesale cur-
tailment of fundamental liberties resulting from guardianship, are po-
tent reasons to apply the least restrictive alternative. If applied, it
would have the beneficent effect of depriving the ward of only those
rights that he is plainly incapable of exercising. 144
B. Right to Treatment
Another major substantive deficiency in guardianship is that, in a
clear majority of jurisdictions, the guardian, although tnder a duty to
maintain the person and property of the ward, is not required to
secure treatment or habilitation. 145 Most states leave the decision to
the guardian, 146 by providing that he shall arrange for such services
"whenever appropriate." 147 Only a handful of jurisdictions compel
the guardian to provide services that will maximize the ward's self
reliance. 148
It can be safely assumed that most individuals under guardianship
could become more independent if they received proper treatment
and education. The situation of the mentally retarded, many of whom
are subject to guardianship, is a useful paradigm. For most of this
century, mentally retarded persons were viewed as incapable of intel-
lectual growth. As objects of custodial care, the\, were at best pitied;
New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Stipp. 752,
762-63 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Burgdorf & Burgdorf. A History of Unequal Treatment: The
Qualifications of Handicapped Persons as "Suspect Class" Under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, 15 Santa Clara Law. 855 (1975).
144. But see Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp.. 612 F.2d 84, 126-30
(3d Cir. 1979) (Seitz, J. dissenting) (questioning whether least restrictive alternative is
the appropriate approach to determine the degree of freedom to be accorded men-
tally retarded residents of state institution), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 2984 (19SO).
145. Habilitation is a process employing education techniques or treatment pro-
grams designed to enable a mentally retarded individual to acquire and maintain life
skills, which allow "him to cope more effectively %vith the denands of his ownii person
and his environment and to raise the level of his physical, mental, and social effi-
ciency." Wyatt v. Sticknev, 344 F. Supp. 387, 395 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affJd in part,
remanded in part and decision reserved in part sub non. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503
F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). Although habilitation usually refers to the treatment of the
mentally retarded, it can describe an education or treatment plan for any disabled
individual subject to guardianship. Thirty-six states have no provisions requiring the
private guardian to "secure habilitation" for the ward. See Guardianship & Conser-
vatorship, supra note 6, Table V, at 33-37.
146. Guardianship & Conservatorship, supra note 6, Table V. at 33-37.
147. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 13.26.150(a)(2) (Supp. 1980); Idalo Code § 15-5-
312(2) (1979); Or. Rev. Stat. § 126.137(l)(1) (1979); Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-312(1)(b)
(1978).
148. Only ten states require "habilitation." See Guardianship & Conservatorship,
supra note 6, Table V, at 33-37.
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often they were regarded as subhuman, diseased, or a menace to so-
ciety. 149 As a result, they were frequently shunted into large public
institutions and segregated from society. This outdated view has been
replaced by a developmental model of mental retardation that rec-
ognizes that every mentally retarded person has potential for growth,
learning, and development, regardless of age or degree of retarda-
tion. 150 With appropriate treatment and habilitation, 151 it has been
suggested that almost all mentally retarded individuals can be
economically productive, at least in a sheltered employment con-
text. 152
In recent years the rights of the mentally retarded have been
widely advocated. 153 Congress has responded by enacting major
legislation on their behalf. The Developmentally Disabled Assistance
and Bill of Rights Act 154 and the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act of 1975 155 expressly recognize that mentally retarded
adults and children have a right to treatment, habilitation, and educa-
tion designed to maximize their developmental potential. To protect
these rights, Congress requires the states, as a condition of receiving
federal finding under these programs, to develop individual plans for
each of their disabled citizens receiving services under these Acts.' 50
Similar legislation focusing on the problems of other disabled
classes subject to guardianship would undoubtedly increase their self
reliance and independence. 157 It has been urged that an individual
149. See Legal Rights, supra note 9, at 131; Mason & Menolascino, The Right to
Treatment for Mentally Retarded Citizens: An Evolving Legal and Scientific Inter-
face, 10 Creighton L. Rev. 124, 132-36 (1976); Roos, The Laic and Mentally Re-
tarded People: An Uncertain Future, 31 Stan. L. Rev. 613 (1979).
150. See Mason & Menolascino, supra note 149, at 136-47; Roos, Mentally Re-
tarded Citizens: Challenge for the 1970's, 23 Syracuse L. Rev. 1059, 1065-66 (1972)
Roos & McCann, Major Trends in Mental Retardation, Int'l J. of Mental Health,
Spring 1977, at 3, 6-7.
151. Behavior modification has successfully helped mentally retarded persons de-
velop to their full potential. See generally Risley & Baer, Operatant Behavior Mod-
ification: The Deliberate Development of Behavior, in I Review of Child Develop-
ment Research 283 (B. Caldwell & H. Ricciuti eds. 1973); Watson, Behavior Modfl-
cation of Residents and Personnel in Institutions for the Mentally Retarded, in Resi-
dential Facilities for the Mentally Retarded 201 (A. Baumeister & E. Butterfield eds.
1970).
152. "[A]pproximately 95% of retarded persons have the potential of being
economic assets to society." Roos, Basic Facts About Mental Retardation, in Legal
Rights, supra note 9, at 127, 132.
153. See The Mentally Retarded Citizen, supra note 138, at 66-70 (if adequate
community services are developed, guardianship should be rarely needed).
154. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6010-6012 (1976).
155. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1976).
156. 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (1976); 42 U.S.C. § 6011 (1976).
157. For a description of the experience of the Veterans Administration in provid-
ing their wards with financial guidance, see The Aged and the Need for Surrogate
Management, supra note 34, at 136.
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treatment plan designed to assist the ward in regaining his compe-
tency or, at the least, maximizing his potential, be prepared and insti-
tuted for each person under guardianship.' 58 Treatment and habilita-
tion would, of course, depend upon the availability of financial re-
sources to purchase these services. When the ward does not person-
ally have these resources, however, a guardian could draw on numer-
ous federal programs that provide funds and services to the dis-
abled.159
The right to treatment and habilitation of a person subject to guard-
ianship may have a constitutional basis. The generalized concept of a
constitutional right to treatment first emerged twenty years ago in an
influential article 160 and has since been widely endorsed.' 6 ' The first
judicial intimations of this right were in Rouse v. Cameron,16 2 in
which Chief Judge Bazelon noted that involuntary hospitalization of
the mentally ill without treatment may be unconstitutional. 16 Since
Rouse, the right to treatment has received judicial recognition in de-
cisions dealing with the involuntary confinement of the mentally
158. See Guardianship & Conservatorship, supra note 6, Model Statute, at 78-167.
Under the Model Statute, the guardian, with the assistance of a professional dis-
abilities resources officer and the disabled individual, if possible, should design a plan
to fulfill the ward's requirements for physical health or safety and to develop or
regain his capacity to manage his affairs. Id. §§ 17-18, at 105-16. The plan must then
be submitted for court approval. Id. § 17(2)(b), at 106.
159. Individuals under guardianship are frequently eligible for supplemental se-
curity income (SSI) under 42 U.S.C. § 1381a (1976). SSI benefits are available to
disabled individuals-an individual "'unable to engage in any substantial gainful activ-
ity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which
... has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than
twelve months." Id. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). Disabled individuals under 65 who receive SSI
funds are required to participate in vocational rehabilitation services, Id. § 1382d(c).
See 29 U.S.C. § 720 (1976), which authorizes grants to states for vocational rehabilita-
tion services to disabled individuals. The Act provides for individualized rehabilita-
tion programs. Id. § 722. These programs may include vocational and training ser-
vices, physical and mental restoration services, and rehabilitation teaching serices.
Id. § 723. Significant services are also available to the disabled under Subchapter
XIX and Subchapter XX. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396, 1397 (1976). Both seek to assist indi-
viduals in achieving self sufficiency. See also Developnentally Disabled Assistance
and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6010 (1976) (providing habilitation services to the
mentally retarded).
160. Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960).
161. See Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. Chi. L. Rev. 742
(1969), Burris, The Right to Treatment. 57 Geo. L.J. 673 (1969). Chambers, Alterna-
tives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Practical Guides and Constitutional
Imperatives, 70 Mich. L. Rev. 1108 (1972) Katz, The Right to Treatment-An En-
chanting Legal Fiction?, 36 U. Chi. L. Rev. 755 (1969 Decelopments. supra note
57, at 1316-33; Note, The Nascent Right to Treatment, 53 Va. L. Rev. 1134
(1967); Note, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness, and the Right to Truatment. 77 Yale
L.J. 87 (1967).
162. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
163. Id. at 455.
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ill,' 164 the mentally retarded, 165 and juvenile delinquents. 16 These
decisions have been based upon either due process, 167 equal protec-
tion, 168 or the eighth amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment. 169
An equal protection argument has seldom been used to gain a right
to treatment because it requires one group to receive services not
being provided to a similarly situated group. In the leading case,
Mills v. Board of Education,170 mentally retarded children were de-
nied the public education available to non-retarded children. The
court found that this discrimination violated the equal protection
clause. 171 In the zoning context, it has similarly been argued that
municipalities should allow group homes for the disabled to be lo-
cated in residential districts because they are the practical equivalent
of a biologically related family. 172 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 codifies this equal protection notion.173 Equal protection,
164. In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp,
387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part, remanded in part and decision reserved in part
sub nora. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
165. Evans v. Washington, 459 F. Supp. 483 (D.D.C. 1978); Halderman v. Penn-
hurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part and remanded en banc, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct.
2984 (1980); Gary W. v. Louisiana, 437 F. Supp. 1209 (ED. La. 1976), aff'd, 601
F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1979); Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974), aff'd
in part, vacated in part and remanded, 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977); Wyatt v.
Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part, remanded in part and
decision reserved in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir.
1974).
166. See Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976
(1974); Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Inmates of Boys
Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972).
167. See Evans v. Washington, 459 F. Supp. 483 (D.D.C. 1978); Halderman v.
Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977), affd in part,
rev'd in part and remanded en banc, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100
S. Ct. 2984 (1980); Gary W. v. Louisiana, 437 F. Supp. 1209 (E.D. La. 1976), aff'd,
601 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1979); Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974),
aff'd in part, vacated in part and remanded, 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977).
168. See Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (SD.N.Y. 1972); Inmates of Boys
Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972).
169. See Nelson v. Lteyne, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976
(1974); Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.V'.Y. 1972); Inmates of Boys
Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972).
170. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
171. Id. at 875. See also Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsyl-
vania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
172. See Timberlake v. Kenkel, 369 F. Supp. 456, 465-66 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vac-
ated and remanded meme., 510 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1975); Note, Group House of Port
Washington v. Board of Zoning and Appeals: Encroachment of Community Resi-
dences into Single Family Districts, 43 Alb. L. Rev. 539, 562 (1979).
173. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976), pro-
vides in pertinent part that "[n]o othervise qualified handicapped individual ...
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however, is concerned with preventing discrimination rather than
granting substantive rights. 174 It is not an effective vehicle for
grounding a right to treatment for individuals under guardianship.
The eighth amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punish-
ment 175 has been a more fruitful source for a right to treatment.
Relying on Robinson v. California,176 which held that incarceration
for drug addiction violated the eighth amendment because it was
punishment for status rather than crime, courts have found that de-
tention of mentally retarded individuals 177 or juvenile delinquents 178
without treatment is impermissible punishment for status. Other
courts have concluded that the eighth amendment right to protection
from harm while in state custody 179 encompasses the right to humane
living conditions at state institutions 180 and the right to be free from
physical risks, injuries, and abuse.181 The eighth amendment's appli-
cation to guardianship, however, was foreclosed by Ingraham v.
Wright,182 in which the Supreme Court limited eighth amendment
protection to those convicted of crime.18 3
shall, solely by reason of his handicap, he excluded from the participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination." Id. The Act has been used
to require that urban mass transit equipment he accessible to handicapped persons,
United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977). to prohibit exclu-
sion of handicapped children from regular public schools, Howard S. v. Friendswood
Independent School Dist., 454 F. Supp. 634 (S.D. Tex. 1978), and to challenge the
relocation of a medical center from an inner city to the outlying suburbs. NAACP v.
Medical Center, Inc., 599 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1979).
174. See New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F.
Supp. 752, 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
175. U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
176. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
177. See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp.. 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1316
(E.D. Pa. 1977), affd in part, rec'd in part and remanded vin bane. 612 F.2d 84 t3d
Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 2984 (1980); Welsch v. Likins. 373 F. Supp.
487, 496-97 (D. Minn. 1974), aff'd in part, vacated in part and remanded. 550 F.2d
1122 (8th Cir. 1977).
178. Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575, 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
179. U.S. Const. amend. VIII: see Logan v. United States, 144 U.S 263 (1892).
180. See Goodman v. Parwatikar, 570 F.2d 801, 804 t8th Cir. 1978). Scott v.
Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 947 (3d Cir. 1976); New York State Ass'n for Retarded Chil-
dren, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 764-65 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
181. See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295,
1320-21 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff[d in part, rec'd in part and remanded en bane. 612
F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), cert granted. 100 S. Ct. 2984 (1980). Welsch v. Likins, 373
F. Supp. 487, 502-03 (D. Minn. 1974), aff'd in part, vacated in part and remanded,
550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977); New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children. Inc. v.
Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 764-65 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). See also Knecht v.
Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136, 1139-40 (8th Cir. 1973).
182. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
183. The question of the applicability of eighth amendment protection to tie men-
tally ill or mentally retarded in closed insitutions remains open. Id. at 669 u.37.
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A right to treatment based upon due process considerations holds
more promise for the person under guardianship. Due process is a
nebulous and flexible term that has been used to justify a right to
treatment.' 84 Essentially, the theory has either a procedural or a
substantive basis. The procedural, or the quid pro quo, approach ar-
gues that commitment to a mental institution or a reformatory is
neither accompanied by the full due process rights that attend a crim-
inal proceeding nor limited to a fixed period as with a criminal sen-
tence. When the rights and limitations of the criminal system are not
observed, a necessary quid pro quo for the deprivation of freedom is
a right to treatment. 185 If accepted by the courts, the quid pro quo
theory would provide a rationale for a right to treatment in guardian-
ship, which has minimal procedural protection and is of an indefinite
duration. The theory, however, is flawed. Although the Supreme
Court has referred to rehabilitation as a justification for lack of pro-
cedural safeguards in the juvenile justice system,' 8 6 it has not been a
consistent theme in its due process cases. Frequently, a departure
from criminal procedural safeguards is justified by balancing the in-
terests of the individual and society, 18 7 rather than legal bartering.
Moreover, by transforming procedural concerns into substantive stan-
dards, the state could discharge its obligation to provide treatment
simply by amending the apposite procedures. 188
A stronger argument is founded on the substantive due process
claim. Under this approach, the legislative means must be rationally
related to the ends sought. 189 The Supreme Court employed this
standard in evaluating the indefinite commitment of a criminal defen-
dant who lacked the capacity to stand trial.190 In the civil commit-
184. See generally Spece, Preserving the Right to Treatment: A Critical Asssess-
ment and Constructive Development of Constitutional Right to Treatment Theories,
20 Ariz. L. Rev. 1 (1978).
185. Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136, 1138 (8th Cir. 1973); Martarella v. Kelley,
349 F. Supp. 575, 599-600 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Inmates of Boys Training School v.
Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354, 1363-64 (D.R.I. 1972); see I)onaldson v. O'Connor, 493
F.2d 507, 522-25 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) New
York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752
(E.D.N.Y. 1973).
186. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 540-41 (1971); In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358, 359 & n.1 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 22 n.30 (1967).
187. See Donaldson v. O'Connor, 422 U.S. 563, 585-86 (1975) (Burger, C.J., con-
curring); note 53 supra and accompanying text.
188. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 422 U.S. 563, 587 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
see Developments, supra note 57, at 1325 n.39.
189. Due process was initially used to strike down legislation in the economic
realm. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 524 (1934); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923). Although abandoned in the field of economics, it has heen
used to protect individual rights against governmental intervention. See Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972).
190. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 718 (1972).
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ment of the mentally retarded and the mentally ill, courts have
reasoned that if the purpose of confinement is treatment and treat-
ment is not forthcoming, the rational relation between means and
ends is missing, thereby rendering the commitment invalid.1 91 Judge
Johnson, then Chief Judge of the District Court for the Middle Dis-
trict of Alabama, wrote that "[t]o deprive any citizen of his or her
liberty upon the altruistic theory that the confinement is for humane
therapeutic reasons and then fail to provide adequate treatment vio-
lates the very fundamentals of due process." 192
The applicability of this theory to guardianship turns upon the per-
ceived purpose of guardianship. Historically, it was used to protect
property rather than to provide humane care or treatment.193
Nevertheless, as parens patriae, the state was also required to pro-
mote the interests and welfare of the ward. 194 These interests would
be materially advanced by providing a habilitation or treatment pro-
gram designed to lessen dependency. When this purpose is combined
with the notion of the least restrictive alternative, a right to treatment
emerges.195
The right to treatment cases have arisen when an individual's phys-
ical liberty is curtailed by confinement to an institution. Therefore, it
may be contended that, because guardianship does not involve a de-
privation of physical liberty, a ward enjoys no constitutional right to
treatment. In Lora v. Board of Educationz' 9 6 however, the court
found a due process right to treatment for students who were reas-
signed to special day schools from regular public schools, not-
withstanding the lack of institutional confinement.1 97 If a deprivation
of basic liberties is sufficient to trigger this right, then the ward is enti-
tled to the treatment and habilitation that he plainly deserves.
CONCLUSION
Guardianship reform is long overdue. The la.x procedures surround-
ing appointment of a guardian are simply not consistent with the
more formalized safeguards integrated into the civil commitment
191. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 521 (5th Cir. 1974). vacated and re-
manded, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). Haldennan v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp.. 446 F.
Supp. 1295, 1315-16 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd in part, recr'd in part and remanded en
banc, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 2984 (1980;
Welsch v. Lildns, 373 F. Supp. 487, 496 (D. Minn. 1974). aff'd in part, racated in
part and remanded, 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977).
192. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 785 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
193. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
194. See Witter v. County Comn'rs, 256 II!. 616, 622-23. 100 N.E. 148, 150
(1912); Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 Harv. L. Rev. 104 (1909); Derelopmnents, supra
note 57, at 1190, 1207-10.
195. See Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1313 (5th Cir. 1974).
196. 456 F: Supp. 1211 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 623 F.2d 248 (2d Cir. 1980).
197. Id. at 1275.
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process. Furthermore, the view that guardianship is primarily a
method for preserving the ward's estate must be tempered by the
realization that guardianship imposes severe restrictions on the liberty
of the incompetent. It is not only unconscionable, but unlawful, to
impose a blanket guardianship without tailoring the specific restric-
tions to a ward's demonstrated needs and devising a prescriptive
treatment plan designed to help the ward gain greater independence.
Affording procedural safeguards for the guardianship hearing, limiting
the number of restrictions placed on the ward to an absolute
minimum necessary for his well-being, and providing decent treat-
ment to maximize his developmental potential seem to be highly de-
sirable goals. Until such time as they are incorporated into guardian-
ship statutes, however, the Constitution provides the source for at-
taining these goals.
